The ability to know right from wrong is one thing that helps set us apart from the animals that we keep as pets, visit in the zoo, or cook up for dinner. It’s what makes us human. And since we have the ability to think rationally, that must be how we know whether something is wrong, right? But when we’re given a controversial situation, do we really act as judges, carefully considering all sides and consequences before reaching a verdict? Or, do we react first with emotion, and only use reason to—like lawyers—justify whichever side we have chosen? Scientists Paul Bloom and Frans De Waal take opposing sides on this issue, with De Waal defending the importance of emotion in judgment and Bloom insisting that reason has a larger role; however, both authors agree that morality does not come from just emotion or just reason, but some combination of the two.
In his article, “The Animal Roots of Human Morality”, primatologist De Waal the argues that emotion is key in moral judgment. To support his point, he first draws attention to a study performed by psychologist Jonathan Haidt, where subjects were given examples of questionable behavior. In the case of sex between a brother and sister, there was immediate disapproval. Subjects then defended their views, and continued to insist on the wrongness of the situation even when every argument had been challenged. The subjects were acting the role of lawyers rather than judges, relying on emotion before reason.
But, not only does De Waal’s article reveal our own tendency toward emotional moral judgments, it draws connections to similar behavior in animals. Primates, according to Waal, exhibit evidence of both empathy and reciprocity—both of which he identifies as important emotional factors in morality. Chimpanzees will comfort the victim of an attack by another chimp and a chimpanzee given food to split within the group will share more generously with a chimpanzee that had groomed him or her earlier. Waal does not use this to say that chimpanzees are moral beings, but that the basis of our human morality may be more instinctive and animalistic than reason alone would allow.
Bloom, on the other hand, insists that reason plays a more important role. Emotional responses alone, he argues, could not explain how our moral views have changed over time. Two hundred years ago, many people in the United States saw no moral problem with denying women equal political rights; however, in the present day, inequality is labeled morally “wrong”. Similar moral changes have occurred when it comes to the issues of slavery, animal cruelty, and other issues. If emotion alone were responsible for our morals, how would these changes have come about?
Instead, Bloom attributes moral change to the power of persuasion. In the case of slavery, for example, the novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin helped the public to empathize and see wrongness where they hadn’t before. Bloom applies this idea to everyday life as well, suggesting that our regular interactions help shape the ideas of those around us, particularly children, about the moral issues we face on a daily basis, and require us to deliberate and form opinions rather than simply react. Emotional response, he insists, still is important to expressing a moral view, but it is reason and persuasion that form the moral views we instinctively react to.
In the end, it’s Bloom that has me more convinced. Unlike De Waal, he explains the role of both emotion and reason, in a believable way. De Waal leaves the role of reason more open, which makes his argument weaker. Of course, there’s always the chance that I—like many other people—would simply rather believe that I’ve formed my moral opinions through some use of reason rather than just blindly defending what my gut tells me is right or wrong.
Bloom, Paul. “How do Morals change?” Nature 464, 490 (25 March 2010). Web. 15 Sept. 2010.
De Waal, Frans. "The animal roots of human morality." New Scientist 192.2573 (2006): 60-61. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 15 Sept. 2010.
Image: flickr.com/jacobcvinson
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